Semantron 2013

Semantron 2013

Contents

List of contributors

The human thing: editor’s introduction

INEQUALITY

2

The Erasmus Competition NEIL CROALLY

3

Would a good society be an equal society? WILL COOK

6

Would a good society be an equal society? HENRY DICKIE

8

Can inequality ever be justified? FRANCIS AZNARAN

12

Can inequality ever be justified? ALI NEDEN

CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE

16

Reform of English libel law JONATHAN LEE

20

How independent is the judiciary? OLI PICKEN

24

The digital revolution: history and journalism JACOB SACKS-JONES

31

The importance of cultural evolution in the spread of homo sapiens TOM HYMAS

35

Humanity and environmental change JONATHAN WILSON

42

Modernism and modernity OLIVER BARNES

45

Economics and the rise of contemporary Chinese Art MICHAEL HUANG

LOOSE CHANGE

51

How free should a free market be? JINWOOK JUNG

54

Quantitative Easing YANWEI GE

CHANGE AND THE PAST

61

Succession in the Ottoman Sultanate PATRICK KENNY

65

The American Revolution and the unity of the American people TOM HILL

67

British attitudes to empire in the 19 th century ALEX SCOTT-MALDEN

70

Italian nationalism and the unification of Italy GILES POOLE

CHANGE: FORGETTING, KNOWING, CLINGING

75

Why do we forget things? OLIVER REES

79

Addiction VHINOTH SIVAKUMARAN

84

Empiricism and reality ALEX MURPHY

LOOKING UP

88

The emerging vertical city SIMON WONG

95

Why is the sky blue? AMBROSE YIM

SUI GENERIS

105

What is magical about ancient literature? PATRICK KING

Contributors

FRANCIS AZNARAN is in the Remove, and plans to study Mathematics at university.

OLIVER BARNES leaves this summer and is taking a gap year.

WILL COOK is in the Remove, and plans to study PPE at university.

HENRY DICKIE is in the Remove, and plans to study Mathematics at university.

YANWEI GE leaves this summer to study Economics at LSE.

TOM HILL leaves this summer to study History at Durham.

MICHAEL HUANG leaves this summer to study History of Art at UCL.

TOM HYMAS leaves this summer to study Human Sciences at New College, Oxford.

JINWOOK JUNG leaves this summer to study Economics at Warwick.

PATRICK KENNY leaves this summer and is taking a gap year.

PATRICK KING is in the Remove, and plans to study Classics at university.

JONATHAN LEE leaves this summer to study Law at Trinity College, Cambridge.

ALEX MURPHY leaves this summer and is taking a gap year.

ALI NEDEN is in the Remove, and plans to study Classics at university.

OLIVER PICKEN leaves this summer to study Law at Bristol.

GILES POOLE leaves this summer to study Modern Languages and History at Durham.

OLIVER REES leaves this summer to study Medicine at Imperial College, London.

ALEX SCOTT-MALDEN leaves this summer to study History and Politics at Exeter.

VHINOTH SIVAKUMARAN leaves this summer to study Medicine at Edinburgh.

SIMON WONG leaves this summer to study Civil Engineering at Imperial College, London.

AMBROSE YIM leaves this summer to study Physics at St. John’s College, Oxford.

The human thing: editor’s introduction

Neil Croally

‘The human thing’ is a phrase used by the great Greek historian, Thucydides, to explain why his work may be different from his immediate predecessor, Herodotus. Explanations based on gods, the supernatural, or the fantastic will – Thucydides says – be absent from his work: he will concentrate instead on the human thing. Most of the essays in this volume come from the humanities and, for a change, all are by students. There are therefore two things to consider. It first needs to be said that there is no anti- science view at Semantron : quite the opposite, in fact. But the essays I have received this year have addressed important concerns mainly from economic, historical, philosophical and anthropological perspectives. One works with what one has. This accident has at least allowed some editorial reflection on the messiness of our human condition. Anyway, I hope that you find the essays enjoyable and illuminating.

PART ONE

INEQUALITY

The Erasmus Competition

Neil Croally

The Erasmus competition has been running for several years now. Thirteen schools take part in this inter-school competition, and it runs as follows. The host school – this year, Charterhouse – approaches a prominent academic in the humanities and asks her to set a theme to provide a bibliography. This part of the competition is normally over by May. The theme and the bibliography are made available to any Year 11 or Remove boy who wishes to take part. A date is agreed for the examination to take place in mid-September. The examination itself lasts three hours; candidates write one essay from a choice of

two questions. I think that this is a properly challenging test.

The College entered for the first time this year. The theme was Inequality , set by Professor Jonathan Wolff of UCL, one of this country’s preeminent political philosophers. Eleven of our boys entered, and the four best essays – the ones sent to Professor Wolff – are printed below. The two essay questions chosen by Professor Wolff will be clear from the titles. It is worth knowing as well that Will Cook’s essay won third prize. The theme this year is Consciousness and the Brain , and the judge is Professor David Papineau of King’s College, London.

Would a good society be an equal society?

Will Cook

Almost every political philosopher attempts in some way to find a vision of society that would bring the greatest benefit to all people. But in terms of equality, they are faces with two fundamental questions. First, whether or not equality is a good thing in itself, and second, whether equality can be achieved without compromising other values to an unacceptable degree. the Origin of Inequality, Jean-Jacques Rousseau lays out a theory as to why inequality has come to exist. He feels that in man’s natural, primitive state, he has a non-destructive self-love and also a compassion for others. These two characteristics together help to preserve the human race. However, as soon as men begin to interact with each other, these values are corrupted and replaced with competition, hatred and greed. It is this competition and comparison between men that will always cause inequality whenever they come together. Rousseau regrets inequality but imagines no real society without it. He feels that inequality is inevitable if men interact and therefore inevitable in any kind of civil society. We can infer from this that he feels inequality is a necessary evil if we are to have any kind of society at all. Therefore, though inequality is an evil, if we are to have any kind of civil society, it must exist. Any ‘good’ society must by its nature be unequal. There are those however who feel that there are ways in society through which we can get rid of inequality. In the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels lay out that inequality through class divisions comes about In his work Discourse on

through exploitation of the proletariat. The capitalist system and the existence of private property allows the workers to be suppressed by the bourgeois. Marx clearly feels that equality is important. But he also lays out his vision of a society whereby we can achieve it. Here it is necessary to abolish all private property and disregard much personal liberty. All people simply become arms of the state and work for the government. In this way we can have a fair distribution and an equal society. Perhaps the main problem with this is that it relies on everyone valuing equality as the most important ideal. Once people are more unhappy with their liberty being taken away than the nominal equality which is achieved, it seems impossible for this society to be a ‘good’ one. Surely a society that is good is one people want to live in. We have seen throughout history that many societies which have taken on Marxist ideals have not been happy ones. Therefore it is clear that we cannot disregard liberty. In terms of happiness it is foolish to assume that equality is the only thing that matters. This becomes more important when taking a ‘good’ society to be one that functions properly. Many communist governments have collapsed because people were no longer willing to give up such freedoms. Robert Nozick takes the view that equality is not necessarily a good thing in itself. He questions why a fair distribution is one that must be exactly equal. Instead he feels that fairness comes about through how people choose to distribute money and resources. There may be rich people like basketball

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Will Cook

society in which two people are inherently and irreversibly inequal, no matter the choices they make. In A Theory of Justice , John Rawls explores this concept through the veil of ignorance. He says that the people who do not care about inequality in society are those who benefit from the unequal system. If we were to enter a society without any idea of who we were or our position within it, we would always choose a more equal one. He claims that when we detach ourselves from our stake in society, everyone truly wants a society that is fair, and everyone will always come to the conclusion that justice is most important. Equality becomes important once we consider the arbitrary nature of how resources are distributed and how positions are allocated. The reason equality is unfair is because of this randomness and because we all believe in a natural justice. However, more than the other writers, Rawls recognized the trade-offs that must be made between equality and liberty. Therefore he sets out two principles of justice. First, that personal liberty should be maximized and second, that inequality should only exist in order to benefit the disadvantaged. We can see that though he believes in tax and redistribution, necessary rights like voting and free speech should not be curtailed. Here he is distinct from Marx in recognizing that there is only so far we can go in trying to pursue equality. Rawls’ philosophy can best be described as egalitarian insofar as he values equality, but only as a means for justice. What is most important is the overall happiness of people and fairness of society. We can see hi taking a middle ground between Marx and Nozick by valuing ‘equality of opportunity’. This means people can still determine their own lives, but the starting point of all people must be equal.

players in a society, but that is only because people have made the decision to pay and watch him play. Equally, the idea of hard work must not be disregarded. Can it really be fair or just for someone who does no work and someone who constantly strives to improve their life to be equally placed in society? Many people seem to assume that equality is a virtue without thinking about what it actually means. What is more important than equality is giving people the freedom and liberty to live the good life as they see it. Here Nozick argues for a minimalist state and minimum government intervention. Only then will people be able to make decisions as to how they live in a way that makes everyone most happy. What is crucial here is that humans are ends in themselves, and the rights of individuals must be respected. Private property and personal freedom are paramount, and any government trying to infringe on them cannot be justified. The way in which governments attempt redistribution is taxation, but Nozick feels this is morally equivalent to stealing. It is clear that in Nozick’s eyes a good society is not an equal one, as in his ‘Utopia’ there is a minimalist state and the rights of individuals should never be infringed upon. He challenges not only the notion that equality is a fair or just value, but also the fact that trying to achieve equality will make any of us happier, any of us better off, or any of us live a more fulfilling life. But what we must question here is whether people are equal at birth. The issue of hard work may well be an important one, but it is possible for those at the bottom of society to work far harder than those at the top. This is because of the historical oppression Marx talked about, but also the inherent unfairness of the birth lottery. Inequalities exist from birth through things such as your parents’ wealth, your family, your location and your background. It cannot possibly be a good

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Furthermore, he is willing to tolerate inequality if it benefits the poorest. He is less concerned with the gap between rich and poor and more concerned with the level the poor are at. He would be tolerant of the capitalist system which Marx detests and Nozick admires, as long as it benefitted those who are the most disadvantaged. We can see this in modern society through economic growth. Though it may create new inequalities and perpetuate existing ones, it can at least raise many people out of poverty, and ensure overall happiness and utility is greater. When considering what is ‘good’ about a society we must take into account a range of values and ideals. It is not enough to make equality an absolute and expect fairness to follow. This is particularly true when we consider that in many cases equality it may be unfair. Is it proper to value two people the same in society when one evidently contributes more? What we can see developing is the idea that equality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a good society. There are obvious natural unfairnesses and injustices which we should try to eliminate but society is about more than just this.

notion of ‘society’, we can easily forget that it is something composed of and invented by humans. By ignoring the freedom and wishes of those within a society we detriment the society itself. I believe that though a good society would have to be equal in some way, not all equal societies are good ones. The utopia of Marx is one in which individuals are homogenized and compressed into a single entity, at the expense of their freedom. It is impossible to make a society good and at the same time ignore liberty. Equally though, Nozick’s ‘Utopia’ is one where unfairness is allowed to breed and the vices of men are unrestrained. The fact that men will naturally compete and undercut each other surely means that we should have a higher power to protect those that are disadvantaged by the system, and prevent society collapsing. Therefore I feel any good society must strike a balance. In order to allow people to live the good life in the way they see fit, there must be a system to allow equality of opportunity. But in order for equality to achieve its overall end of happiness, it must no disregard the liberty of individuals. Equality is a good, but it is not an absolute good. A good society may well be an equal one, but it would also have to be more than that.

It should value liberty and the rights of an individual. By becoming preoccupied with the

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Would a good society be an equal society?

Henry Dickie

The question over equality is one of the most important of our time. Many argue that equality is an absolute necessity, while many more say the opposite – that it is to be avoided if a good society is desired. I aim to argue something near the middle: that the desirability and necessity of equality to a good society depends not only on the type of equality being discussed but also on whether or not equality replaces something else (most notably liberty). In doing so I will try to establish whether a good society would be an equal one. Before we begin to decide on the answer to the question, we must establish what we mean by 'equal', for, as I said earlier, there are several types. The first of these is one talked about by Rousseau: natural equality (though he argued about natural inequality, they are two sides of the same coin). Natural equality, which would mean equality of physical and mental qualities between people will not be mentioned further in this essay, as achieving it would be almost, if not completely, impossible, and it would require gross violations of freedom and privacy. As well as this, natural equality would be highly unnecessary in a society with adequate provisions for social equality. In addition to natural equality there is equality under the law, which I will also leave aside, as it is easy to justify as all people who intend to commit a crime, while of sound mind, are equally criminals. And so we come to the final two main types, on which this essay will focus- equality of opportunities and equality of outcomes, which together make up social equality. These two are the most interesting and most debated about, and so form the core of this essay. Equality of opportunity and of outcome are two different, but very closely linked concepts. Equality of opportunity is where everyone has the same opportunity, the same start, and that what happens later is up to them, while equality of outcomes suggests that people

must be made equal throughout their lives. The difference can be illustrated with a simple analogy. Two men are given two fish each. A cat comes and snatches away the second man's fish, leaving him with none. An equalist of opportunity would say that everything is fine, while an equalist of outcome would give one of the first man's fish to the second man. And so we come to the main part of this essay. To decide whether a good society is an equal one we must first establish whether equality would replace liberty, as while equality is regarded as generally a good thing, so is liberty, and there can often be a conflict between them. For example, in the fish analogy, taking the fish and giving it to the second man impinges on the first man's freedom to keep his property. This conflict is often seen in western economies due to redistributive taxation, and in regulation such as labour laws, which can be respectively seen to affect the freedom of the wealthy, and on the freedom of workers and employers. This conflict is impossibly hard to reconcile in the case of equality of outcome, but still occurs with equality of opportunities. For example, the liberty of a parent to pay for a private education for their child impedes equality of opportunity across the child's generation, as some children cannot go to a private school. Another example is in labour laws. These do not seem to be needed to achieve equality of opportunities, as people have the choice whether or not to work for a firm, and yet they can be justified without resorting to equality of outcomes, which itself is far harder to justify, due to its extreme conflicts with liberty (which usually trumps most other concerns). This justification of labour laws using the idea of equality of opportunities, which can itself be justified along similar lines as that of equality under the law, revolves around the idea of power, and of being equally free. For example, consider a poor worker and a large company.

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The worker needs to provide food for himself, and his family. As such he must find work. The large company is hiring, and many people are applying for jobs, more than there are vacancies. At this point the worker and the company do not have equality of opportunity, as the worker has no choice but to take whatever job is offered him, while the company has the freedom, knowing this, to dictate whatever terms, pay, and hours they want to the worker. As such the worker and the company do not have equality of opportunity. This justification can be recycled and used for many other conflicts, as it reconciles equality and liberty, as in the example the two parties are not equally free. Another concept equally important to reconciling liberty and equality is that of the social contract, which is the idea that by utilizing a public service provided in a country, one implicitly agrees to abide by the laws and regulations of a country, thus avoiding potential conflicts by stating that the people have already implicitly agreed to whatever happens, although it could still be said that, much like the worker in my earlier example, people have no choice but to agree to the contract. In addition to this, there is more supportive evidence for equality of opportunity over equality of outcome in the form of prison. One could make an argument that, as the prison population cannot leave prison, while the

general populace can go where they please, prisoners do not have equality. However, with an equality of opportunity system, this issue does not occur, as the prisoners had the opportunity to stay free. There is one final point to cover, that of partial versus total equality. Total equality is the standard form where everyone has exactly the same, and I have mainly written concerning this. However, partial equality guarantees a minimum level, which everyone must be above- for example everyone must not be homeless- you can have however many homes you like, but everyone must have at least one. Partial equality is far easier to justify and is often better than total equality. And so we come to the crux of the argument, whether a good society is an equal one. I would argue that it is, as equality is beneficial to all. I would also argue that it also depends on the type of equality being talked about: total equality in law is necessary, while equality of opportunity is debateable, and only possibly needed in partial form, and equality of outcome is often detrimental. However, while equality is necessary to a good society, it is not sufficient for one. There are many other requirements to a good society, such as liberty and law, that equality is unlikely to even be the most important, with liberty taking that spot. And so, in conclusion, equality is necessary, but not sufficient for a good society.

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Can inequality ever be justified?

Francis Aznaran

To ask whether inequality can be justified is to suppose in the first place that it is somehow a bad thing. A ‘thing’ which is inherently ‘good’ (I am aware of the vagueness of such terms) would surely not require justification, it would be accepted as a right thing to advocate (or enforce) simply by its being good. As ‘justification’ is required with regards to inequality, I shall accept the premise that inequality is fundamentally bad – as it is unfair, immoral and so forth – but what I will explore, whether inequality has any benefits, direct or indirect, which somehow collectively outweigh the ‘badness’ created by inequality in the first place. In his Discourse Rousseau begins with the ideas for natural inequality conventional inequality and political inequality. I will address first ‘natural’ inequality. What is meant by this term is inequality which manifests itself in differences between the bodies or minds of different individuals; for example, person A is taller than person B (hereafter called A and B respectively), or A is more aesthetically attractive than person B, or A has a quicker mind than B. Such inequalities are those with which we are born. Therefore, we cannot attempt to justify them; to do so would be to question the judgement of nature, which acts largely arbitrarily and unpredictably. That is to say, if A is taller than B, it is simply a question of luck, of chance (assuming both have been fed equally etc.) Save from chopping off A’s legs, there is nothing we can do to amend the inequality between A and B. To question whether the difference in height is effectively meaningless. It is accepted generally and I must agree with this, that if A is taller than you, that is simply something up with which you have to put. Realize also that since the distribution of such

features by nature is largely random, it is more than likely that, for example, although A is taller than you, you are better looking than him; and although A is naturally smarter than you, you are a faster runner, and so on. In this way, many of the ‘natural’ inequalities between men balance or cancel one another. And if they don’t? Well, I reiterate, such things simply seem to be the luck of the draw. You will have to put up with your lot. I concede that this is a depressingly unsatisfactory conclusion, since I am effectively saying ‘that’s it, live with it’, but I see no other way to reconcile natural inequality with standard moral codes. That said, there is much provision for dealing with those inequalities of nature that are far more apparent, extreme or impeding. For example, those with non-existent or non- functional legs are given wheelchairs, so that they might travel with almost the same ease and speed of their legged peers. Dyslexics are given laptops so that they can write with the same legibility of their peers. While this may seem to constitute a justification of said inequalities, it is only an amendment of already existing ‘natural’ inequalities – and not a complete one at that, since by today’s standards at least, a wheelchair does not give the user the same or equivalent functions as would working legs. For the less pronounced inequalities (A is taller than you), however, there is little we can do about it. What’s more, Darwinist theory of genetics has showed that variation within the gene pool (such as different heights) is in fact a good thing for the entire species. The ramifications of natural inequality, however, are more far-reaching than a simple difference in height. Rousseau hypothesises that ‘conventional’ inequality (of money, land, power etc.) is intertwined with natural

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inequality – that perhaps the former is simply a result of the latter. That is to say, if A is richer then B, it may be because A or his ancestors is/were taller (and therefore e.g. a better fighter) than B. This seems extremely plausible. It is true that in the most primitive of societies (i.e. those from which our society is descended), the strongest individuals had the most influence e.g. Goliath and the Philistines, other more modern but primitive groups like Blackbeard and his pirates, modern street gang leaders etc. If we remember the previous conclusion (that we have to accept natural inequality), then it follows that we must also accept conventional inequalities that arise from natural inequalities. This may be prudent, for example if the alpha males in a troglodytic tribe who held all weaponry were also the strongest, they would be best suited to defend the tribe from predators or other tribes, i.e. they would be best suited to have this position of weapon-carrier. He surely therefore, in a sense, deserves that powerful position. However, I think it would be dangerous to extrapolate this rule to other areas. Taller of stronger individuals, for example, should not be treated better by a judiciary system. It is

just to give them those positions which would be beneficial (defender of the tribe, as in the earlier example) but unjust to give them any more than this. It is at this point that the effects of natural inequality cannot be justified. For example, if a tall or strong man A steals from or kills a shorter or weaker man, is this just? Certainly not. For although the inequality (between, for example, the man now with more food, or who is now still alive) has arisen from the natural inequality of A being taller. A has gone out of his way to create yet more inequality. In this sense I agree with Rawls economic principle: accept the existence and inevitability of inequality, but minimize its negative effects. Next, to ‘conventional’ inequality – of money, possessions and so on. Since the time of J.S Mills, the Right has attempted to justify inequalities of income by ‘marginal income theory’. IF there are discrepancies between wages of different individuals (which of course there are) it is only as a result of discrepancies of contribution. That is to say, if A earns more than B, it is only because A contributes more to society than does B. In this vein, we may like to think of a relationship between these two factors entailing direct proportionality:

income

contribution to society

Perhaps, even, we may like to think of an exponential relationship, so that contribution

to society is doubly rewarded, and thus greater incentive exists:

income

contribution to society

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Francis Aznaran

However, what is plan is that the above relationship does not hold true for all values. Some bankers, almost uniformly society’s highest earners, enjoy huge bonuses and compensation, but many of them caused the

current crash. In this way, they receive the highest pay for the worst contribution, modelling bizarrely, the graph of y=1x1 or (and how fittingly) the other side of y=x2:

income

i.e high income but contribution is actually negative

contribution to society

However, this does certainly not hold in all cases, since many (doctors, for example) earn higher than others because society values their contribution more. Inequality of ownership probably originated from agriculture. Those who could work the land, owned the land. However, as Marx insists, in modern times, this right of ownership has been twisted so that the proverbial ‘farmland’ (factory etc.) is owed by not those who work on it (the proletariat) but by employers (the bourgeoisie). In this way, the workers are alienated from the fruits of their own labour. It is owned by the bourgeoisie which pays the worker minimally. Marx actually specifically states that a worker is paid only as much as is necessary to keep him alive and working. What’s more, he is forced into the work as in the case is work or starve. He also has to compete with other members of the proletariat for said job. This, says Marx, is an existence neither happy nor just. He therefore advocates the ownership by the state of all proverbial ‘farmland’ – i.e. the means of goods production. This would render all workers equal, in income as well as before the law. However, as is evident from the economic crisis of the USSR in the 1960-70s, the resulting equality results in a lack of

competition, of incentive, and economic growth is dire at best. What’s more, a few bourgeoisie (ruling elite) develops the Party Members. These individuals enjoy special privilege, near wanton political power and a sense of superiority over the workers. In this way, Marxism does not abolish the bourgeoisie but simply makes it smaller and makes a nation even less democratic. Furthermore, in modern times, the distinction in capitalist states between bourgeoisie and proletariat is less pronounced; its boundary is more blurred. It is possible in modern UK and US to rise up out of each financial birthplace to a better one. Marx’s plans of complete social revolution are far too drastic. That said, it is possible; it is not easy. Ancient networks of old Etonions run this nation. Inequality, both here and in the US, is rampant. On NYC’s world-famous Manhattan Island, for example, in the 1990s, the financial powerhouse of Wall Street and the NYSE stood mere streets away from the impoverished neighbourhood of Harlem, which was undergoing a crack epidemic. In his work A Nation of Immigrants , JFK asserts that when the Pilgrim Fathers landed on the East Coast, they were without class, without every inequality that could have resulted from differences in social rank, land ownership, wealth and so on. In this way, a

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new nation was created without such inequality; a ‘fresh start’. However, it is clear that this ‘experiment in democracy’ has not lived up to its intentions. The USA is today the most unequal developed nation in the world. The American Dream, along with the fantastical stories of Horatio Alger, have largely failed. Lastly, to political inequality. In ancient Athens, the world’s first democracy, all had equal voting power. Since most citizens were ordinary workers, they held sway, that is to say, it is justifiable that they had more political power simply because there were more of them. In modern times, we see, for example, that Rupert Murdoch does not have British citizenship and therefore cannot vote here, but

he effectively has many thousands who can and will vote for him by the influence of his media empire. Political power of this sort cannot be justified because it is concentrated in one individual; not that there are more of him, but because he has financial power. Such individuals operate almost solely under the needs of themselves and those around them, without regard to those many millions whom the political power affects. To conclude, I would say inequality can be justified but only when it is as a result of natural inequalities (which cannot be avoided) or when it does not directly harm another. Inequality cannot be justified if it does not in some way benefit the society which it otherwise affects.

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Can inequality ever be justified?

Ali Neden

Inequality is an inevitability. No two beings are exactly the same, owing either to inborn talents or a range of external factors. This lack of identity has always led, and will always lead, to differences in their environment, however developed the society they are born into is. These two beings, however similar they are, will be judged differently by members of that society and so will be treated differently. Even in the hypothetical idea of cloning, where two beings can be genetically modified to be identical, and thus identical inborn talents will be present, these two beings will not be identical as each individual will have their own unique experience. There is no escaping this. This natural process, that not any two individuals are identical, is inevitable in this so-called ‘state of nature’ or ‘natural state’, and thus inequality itself cannot be avoided. Having established that inequality is inevitable, we must try and conclude whether inequality within a society is justifiable or if it is not then should a state make any attempt to try and rectify that situation, and if it does, to what are the maximum and minimum extents to which it can justifiably go. These inequalities come in many forms: from social to economical, to lack of free speech and property entitlement (inequalities). The first of these inequalities are inborn talents. In a society every individual has a different set of abilities. They may be more intelligent, more likeable or more good- looking than the rest. Thus in a natural state this individual would be given a high ranking in that society, and the rest would follow suit, each individual having a distinct place in society. This idea is very much in line with the values of most capitalist societies, that each member of society received what he deserves

naturally in terms of skills and also by how he works or how he manages situations, which we will come onto later. However, is it correct that an individual should receive more just because he is bon with more talent than another? Is this idea that an individual should gain more because of what he is born with justifiable? John Rawls writes in his Theory of Justice that a man should not receive more because of inborn talents. He argues that every member of society should receive an equal portion of the total sum of society’s output and that these ‘inborn talents’ should count for nothing as they did not come through labour. This is opposed by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia who states that these inborn talents should be justified as they do not infringe on the liberties of others; in short, these inequalities should be permitted as they did not affect others’ liberties or talents, thus inequality here in society can be justified. The second of these inequalities is historical and relates to property entitlement and punishment and injustice in past generations. In a natural state, the individual would have the decision of whom to give his belongings when he died but it would be society’s role to ensure that his wish had been carried. Therefore it is not a fundamental liberty of an individual to receive possessions from the deceased, only a liberty to assign possessions. The same applies to injustice. If a man is wronged then it is his liberty to receive compensation for that wrong, not the liberty of future generations of his family to seek compensation from that injustice. However many would argue that it is a liberty, that they still deserve compensation. Therefore is this

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Ali Neden

inequality that some individuals are better off at the start of their life due to historical events justifiable? Many modern theorists have argued that it isn’t justifiable. The Communist Manifesto states that all entitlement and inheritance laws were to be abolished. John Rawls also agrees with this as his ‘original position’ and ‘first principle’ of justice are ahistorical. They both argue that external factors such as the family you are born into should have no effect on your life. They argue that this leads to the sustained difference in society between the rich and poor, and that all aspects of society from healthcare to education restrict the freedom of movement of individuals from rich to poor and vice versa. They would also argue that wrongdoing done in the past should be rectified in the present; that the inequalities faced by members of the society that have been cause by other members of society should be fixed. In defence of not rectifying the wrongdoings, many have argued that it is difficult to decide how much certain people are owed and what would be their exact position in life if the injustice had not have occurred. These arguments can also be applied to the third inequality, the inequality of opportunity. In a natural state, all individuals are born into different opportunities. They are either born into rich families or poor families and these effect opportunities. This individual would receive merit in society both on his inborn talents and on the opportunities he has had. Marxist theory argues very strongly from an egalitarian viewpoint that all individuals in a society should receive the same opportunity in order to avoid historical factors affecting merit in society, that all historical factors should be removed, in order to remove inequality.

should a state seek to eradicate these inequalities?

John Rawls writes very well on this point. He argues that inequalities in a society can only be justifiable if it benefits the neediest in society; this is called the difference principle. He would argue that the richer members of society have a moral obligation that perhaps should be forced by law to contribute more to improving the lives of the neediest, thus lessening inequality. He would also argue that a government should have a maximum ideology that the maximum effort should be used to benefit the neediest in society, for example, the welfare state. Marxist theory also provides a response to the inequality and believes that it can never be justifiable. It argues that a state should have maximum power to enforce regulations that are supposed to lead to equality for all. By eradicating entitlement, nationalizing healthcare and education and have a central distributive justice and media/transport system, it sought to eradicate inequality. By getting rid of entitlement, Marxist theory means that almost all members of society are born without property. This means that all have equality in their opportunities, certainly by nationalizing healthcare and education (and by ‘nationalizing’ I mean making it all uniform and the same for all members of society). The theory had also eradicated inequality in opportunity, that no individual can achieve more in life because of education or because he can afford healthcare. By centralizing the justice system, media and transport systems, the theory removes equality in opportunity, in media attention and that everyone has to use the same transport, thus lessening inequality. However, although it claims to eradicate inequality as inequality is not justified, it only creates more inequality. Having a central system means that most will not benefit from the central system but an elite few will have

How then, seeing that these inequalities exist either justify or resolve them? To what extent

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Ali Neden

far greater assets than the others, and these assets have also not been gained through hard work, merely by either luck or the position you were born with. In short, the leaders of a Marxist state will not only be in charge of great amounts of power and wealth but they could also not be in possession of it due to inborn talent. This great inequality of wealth between the political elite and their subjects also contradicts Marxist theories ideas, that all mean are equal. As George Orwell writes in his novel Animal Farm , ‘All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.’ Lastly, Marxist theory in practice often leads to many injustices and inequalities caused by the political elite. The ordinary member of society is affected badly by the government and thus in the future there will be inequalities toward that member, which justifiably should be rectified. However, I believe that Marxist theory is incorrect in its ways of eradicating inequality and arguing the inequality can’t be justified, as this leads to more inequality. Nevertheless, I do believe that inequality should be combatted in some way.

Functional social equality states that inequality shall always exist and is a natural process. There is an ever changing power circle where one group of society is more powerful than another at a certain point in time, but later will be less powerful. It states that an over- powerful state will intrude too much on society and create more inequality and that the only approach is to let society balance out the inequality (of course having a government instituted by that society to implement these actions). As John Rawls points out in his Principle of Justice, there are basic liberties that should be upheld to sustain this functional social equality: freedom of speech, of thought, from arrest and to own personal property. These, along with his second principle, about benefitting the neediest in society, will seek to prevent inequality. Therefore I believe that inequality is justified as it is a natural cause of events. 1 Inequalities that come about that do not infringe on the life of others e.g. inborn talents are justifiable. Although there are inequalities that cannot be truly justified there are solutions to them, mainly through society’s choice of taxing the rich to benefit the needy, and thus the inequalities themselves are justified as they are a necessity to try to rectify the problems; it is a vicious circle of inequality.

My views on the matter are very much aligned with the ideas of functional social equality.

1 Mankind is blessed in its capability for free thought and this is what leads to inequality. If we are to have free thought, we must have inequality; it is a necessary evil.

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PART TWO

CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE

Reform of English libel law

Jonathan Lee

Defamation ‘consists in publishing a false statement about the plaintiff which tends to lower him or her in the estimation of right- thinking members of the community generally, or which tends to cause him or her to be shunned or avoided, or which bring him or her into hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or which tend to discredit him or her in his or her trade or profession,’ 2 and is a form of tort – the infringement of the civil rights of other individuals. Libel is a category under the tort of defamation, which refers to the publication of defamatory materials in a permanent and recorded form such as on television, in the press and on a blog. For the general public, libel is rarely directly related to one’s daily life. One may imagine libel law only concerns those in the fields of journalism, business and politics; and people will not be sued as long as they are careful with what they publish and get the facts straight. This is undeniably true, but there is a lot more to defamation law than simply a matter of getting the facts straight in a publication. In order to understand the significance of defamation law to our society, we should start by understanding the defences available to the defendant in litigation. There are four defences to an action for libel, namely justification, absolute privilege, qualified privilege, and fair comment. The defence of justification simply means that a statement cannot be deemed defamatory if it can be proved to be true – ‘It is a complete answer to an action for defamation for the defendant to prove that the statement he published is substantially true.’ 3 Absolute privilege allows individuals involved in judicial proceedings or discussions in the Parliamentto express themselves without defamatory restrictions – ‘The defence of absolute privilege protects defamatory

statements when made in the course of legislative, judicial, and other official proceedings i.e. statements made in court proceedings or in the parliament.’ 4 Qualified privilege allows individuals to make honest opinions in certain occasions ‘when the person to whom a statement is made has a special interest in learning the honestly held views of another person, even if those views are defamatory of someone else and cannot be proved to be true.’ 5 Quoting the words of Lord Atkinson, ‘. . . a privileged occasion is . . . an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential.’ 6 The case of Watt v. Longsdon 7 can be used to illustrate this defence. The director of a company informing the chairman of alleged sexual misconduct involving Mr Watt is deemed to be a privileged communication. However, the act of informing Mr Watt’s wife about the allegations is not. This defence protects individuals who provide ‘honestly held views when the interest [of the person in knowing the views] is of sufficient importance to outweigh the need to protect reputation.’ 8 The defence of fair comment ‘protects honest expressions on matters of public interest.’ 9 This defence, in reality, may be the most importantone as it governs and protects the freedom of speech of journalists and critics. The defence consists of two restrictions – the comment must be on ‘matters of public interest’ and it must be ‘fair’. According to Lord Denning M.R., ‘Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or

4 Ibid. p.54 5 Davies v. Snead (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 608, 611 6 Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309, 334 7 Watt v. Longsdon [1930] 1 K.B. 130. 8 Davies v. Snead op.cit. 9 Ibid. p.54

2 Wacks, R. (2008) Law: A Very Short Introduction p.53 3 Wacks, R. op.cit. p.54

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English Libel Law

concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or others; then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.’ 10 Also, a comment can only be fair when the defendant can show that it is formed on the basis of true facts; and these facts lead the defendant to truly believe in his published comments. The defendant must also show that his sole purpose is to purely comment on the matter without any wrongful intentions such as damaging the reputation of the plaintiff – ‘One constraint does exist upon this defence. The comment must represent the honest belief of its author. If the plaintiff proves he was actuated by malice, this ground of defence will fail.’ 11 Therefore, libel law not only restricts publishers to the mere publication of facts, but governs in what way and under what circumstances they are allowed to publish certain contents and what sorts of comments they are allowed to make. An unfair libel law can be detrimental to the right to freedom of speech and hinder necessary criticisms, debates and discussions which can lead to the betterment of public interest. At this point, the observant reader may already have noticed anoddity about English Libel Law – the burden of proof in a libel action is on the defendant, who must give evidence in order to make one of the defences available for himself. In other words, there is an assumption of guilt in English Libel Law, contraryto the presumption of innocence in the rest of the English Common Law. Moreover, journalists are often obliged to keep their sources a secret. The failure to reveal their sources may work against them in a libel trial, as they struggle to prove their publications free from defamation. Sceptics may argue that since it is the defendant who accused the plaintiff of allegations in the first instance, it naturally should be the defendant’s responsibility to prove one’s innocence by showing the court that the published contents are in fact true or fair comments. However, one should not

overlook the fact that journalists and commentators are normally advised by the editor and their articles are proofread before publication. Any intentional and false assaults and accusations are generally removed, as publishers know better than anyone else how easily libel actions can be taken against them. Yet, journalists critical of certain public issues remain constant targets as under the current system, the suing party does not need to prove actual damage to reputation before taking libel action against them. Therefore, as long as the concerned party is substantially better financed than the individual writer, the law can effectively be manipulated and abused to threaten, intimidate and silence any unfavourable critics. After all, libel litigations are notorious for incurring astronomical legal fees and being extremely time-consuming. Moreover, the defence of fair comment, given its requirement of a basis of facts for the comment, disregards any possible debates and discussions of scientific and academic issues, especially those of important public interest. In British Chiropractic Association v Singh , Simon Singh published an article critical of chiropractic treatments in The Guardian . However, the science journalist was immediately sued for libel by the British Chiropractic Association. Eventually, Singh claimed victory in the case and justified his comments but its high legal fees coupled with the loss of time and earnings led to his withdrawal from his monthly science column and his refraining from commenting on related issues. 12 This case illustrates how easily a resourceful party can silence critics by suing for libel. Unfortunately, the subjects and events these journalists, scientists and non- governmental organizations report, debate and critique are often of important public interest. The reversed burden of proof and the fact that better financed parties often have the upper hand in libel litigations result in a serious chilling effect on healthy debate and criticism on subjects of important public interest. It is submitted that robust scientific and academic debates should not be intervened by libel laws. Although arguments in such debates may not be able to be proved positive at the current stage, only through

10 London Artists Ltd. v. Littler [1969] 2 Q.B. 375, 391 11 Neil, B. and Rampton, R. (1983) Duncan and Neil on Defamation 2 nd ed., p.58-62

12 Singh, S. (2010) Simon Singh: This is goodbye

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